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CURRENT DECISIONS
certain that, without further legislative action, this decision will reverse
the trend. In the words of the Court, this decision reduces, the Gov-
ernment's claim for unpaid taxes to the status of an unsecured claim,
sharing fourth-class priority with unsecured state and local tax claims....
F. Prince Butler
Constitutional Law-ADMISSIBLITY OF EVIDENCE-REASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. In November 1963, a dwelling in Chesapeake,
Virginia was broken into and coins and whiskey were stolen. The fol-
lowing day, the defendant, John E. Hawley arrived at a motel driving a
borrowed automobile. Before checking out on the same day, Hawley
received permission from the motel manager to park the automobile
in front of the office, stating that he would return to pick up the car
in several days. After ten days had passed the manager phoned the
police concerning the vehicle. Learning that the car was believed to
be involved in the burglary, the police proceeded, without a warrant,
to enter through an unlocked door finding under the front seat the
coins and whiskey. Five months later Hawley was apprehended and in-
dicted for the burglary.
At the trial the defendant moved that the coins and whiskey be
excluded as evidence on the ground that they were procured by an un-
reasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 The trial
court overruled the motion, and following the defendant's conviction
for statutory burglary, the cause was brought on error to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia.' The Appellate court held that there was
no error in admitting the coins and whiskey in evidence. They found
that the search and seizure was reasonable on the grounds that the car
had been abandoned by Hawley and that its contents were, therefore,
bona vaCantia.4
1. U.S. Const. Amend. IV
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches seizures, shall not be violated . . "'
2. Hawley v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 479, 144 S.E2d 314 (1965).
3. The court recognized that they were bound to follow the rule established in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) that evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure
is constitutionally inadmissable in state criminal prosecutions.
4. From a determination that the owner had permitted Hawley to use the car during
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The principle of abandonment as it relates to search and seizure has
developed as something of an anomoly. The principle is based on the
theory that if an article has been abandoned its contents are converted
into bona vacantia, and the defendant cannot, therefore, require their
return or suppression.5 Although the courts have established an elaborate
construction defining the limits of reasonable search and seizure," they
have never clearly defined the exact relation of abandoned property
to these formulations. The principle of abandonment has, however,
been characterized by the development of two distinct types:
(1) abandonment of property outside the areas encompassed by the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.7
(2) abandonment within property falling under the protections of the
Constitution to which a possessory interest of another subsequent-
ly attaches.8
Hawley v. Commonwealth falls within the second categoryY In every
the period in question it was found that Hawley had only the right to possession of
the vehicle, and that this right was abandoned when he failed to return. The Court
inferred from the fact that the defendant evidenced an intention to return in three to
four days the collateral presumption that he intended to abandon the car when he
subsequently failed to return. Under these circumstances the abandonment was found
to have occurred before the search therefore placing the property outside of the pro-
tection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
5. United States v. Festa, 192 F.Supp 160 (1960).
6. Exceptions to the well established principle that a search must rest upon a search
warrant have been jealously and carefully drawn by the courts. Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958). They have been allowed only where incident to a valid arrest or
in exceptional circumstances, and even then the burden has been placed upon those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it. Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48
(1941). From these formulations the federal courts have established the construction
that a search is unreasonable unless it is: (1) Authorized by a valid search warrant;
Marion v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Woo Lai Chun v. United States, 274
F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1960); Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961); or (2)
incidental to a valid arrest; Pampenella v. United States, 131 F.Supp 959 (N.D.1ll 1955);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487
(D.C. Cir. 1959); or (3) where the defendant has expressly waived constitutional pro-
tection and voluntarily consented to the search. United States v. Minor, 117 F.Supp.
697 (E.D.Okla. 1959); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co, 155 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir.
1946); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (App. D.C. 1951).
7. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (open fields do not fall within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment).
8. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1961).




previous case of this latter type, where the defendant has abandoned
the seized evidence within a property in which he has only a possessory
interest, consent to the search has been secured from the owner or
lawful possessor of that property. 0 The effect of this requirement has
been to place this type of abandoned property within the context of
reasonable search and seizure by finding it an application of the principle
that a person in lawful possession of the article seized, or the premises
in which they may be found, may under proper circumstances consent
to the search.'"
Here, however, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found as
reasonable a search of abandoned property of this latter type which had
been conducted without the consent of the lawful possessor.' 2 The
court based its decision solely on the "settled" rule "that the right
afforded to persons by the Fourth Amendment . . . does not extend
to abandoned premises or property." 1' The two cases cited by the
court, -Abel v. United States 4 and Fegeur v. United States," in support
of its view that the car was abandoned and the subsequent search rea-
sonable can be sharply distinguished on this very issue of consent. The
explanation for this conflict lies primarily in the fact that the Virginia
court does not make the same distinction between the two types of
abandoned property that has been drawn by other courts in the past.
Rather it held that abandoned property lies outside the established
restrictions on unreasonable search and seizure whether or not the
property is abandoned within areas protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. This result was obtained because the Virginia court has taken the
10. Supra, note 8 (consent of hotel management obtained to search abandoned room);
Fegeur v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962) (consent of landlord to search
room abandoned by tenant); United States v. Calise, 217 F.Supp 705 (S.DN.Y. 1962)
(consent of owner of building to search trash abandoned for collection by lessee
after expiration of the lease); Newingham v. United States 4 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1925)
(search of abandoned desk and files, sold under landlord's warrant with consent of the
purchaser); Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1965) (Postal inspectors
after first obtaining consent from the lessor, entered and seized the abandoned
property).
11. Fredrickson v. United States, 266 F.2d 463 (1959).
12. From the facts is can be established that neither the owner nor the manager
gave consent to the search. The owner did not even know that the police had taken
possession of the car. While the manager, though informing the police that the car
appeared to be abandoned, gave no express consent to any search of the vehicle.
13. Supra, note 2.
14. Supra, note 8.
15. Supra, note 10.
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rule peculiar to the first category of abandoned property,0 and em-
ployed it without distinction to a case which properly falls within the
second.'
However, by upholding the admissibility of the evidence on the sole
ground that the car was abandoned by Hawley, without a finding that
consent had been secured from the subsequent lawful possessor; the
Virginia court has found as reasonable a search without a warrant that
does not lie within the construction which the courts have established
defining the limits to which a search and seizure should be permitted.'
Consequently, abandoned property in Virginia on the basis of this de-
cision is no longer, under any circumstances, related to reasonable
search and seizure, but lies rather within that area to which the Fourth
Amendment has no application.
Robert E. Scott
Criminal Law-CHmoNic ALCOHOLICs CAN NOT BE CONVICTED FOR
PUBLIC DRUNKEN NESS. In the case of Driver v. Hinant,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overruled earlier hold-
ings of the North Carolina State Supreme Court' and a United States
16. Supra, note 7. In this case where property had been abandoned by the owners
in open fields (to which the fourth Amendment guarantees do not extend), the court
held that, "there is no seizure in the sense of law" where the officers examined the
contents of the property after it had been abandoned.
17. For a discussion of the rule that automobiles are protected from unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment see Weller v. Russell, supra, note 9.
18. From this finding follows the presumption that the search cannot be justified
as being reasonable on the basis of any previous federal precedents. If consent is not
required by the Virginia courts in order to make the search reasonable, on what basis
can it be held to be such. Abandonment as a general abstract does not justify a search.
For after property has been abandoned either: (1) it is found in some area outside the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, or (2) it is found in an area secured from un-
reasonable search by constitutional guarantees. Therefore, some other factors must be
present. Logically, if a right to possession is abandoned some others' rights must accede.
Under the second possibility above these new possessory rights would be protected
from unreasonable search. If so, how can a search be reasonable which is conducted,
in the absence of probable cause, without the consent of the acceding possessor?
1. - F.2d (1966).
2. State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
